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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. 
JUDY GIBSON, : Case No. 20080296-CA 
Defendant/ Appellant. : 
Appellant Judy Gibson is challenging the validity of a plea agreement. She has 
addressed the matter in two respects. (Br. of Appellant, Argument B.(l), B.(2)). First, 
Gibson maintains the trial court failed to obtain a knowing and voluntary plea. Under 
Utah law a prosecutor is required to provide amounts in restitution at the time of the plea. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-202 (2003). In this case, the prosecutor represented that 
restitution was a major concern; however, he failed to disclose amounts. Thus, Gibson 
was not properly informed of the consequences of the plea. The plea was not knowing 
and voluntary. (Br. of Appellant, Argument B.(l)). 
Second, and in the alternative, the trial court erred in upholding the plea since the 
parties failed at the time of the agreement to reach a meeting of the minds as to an 
essential term: Le^, the amount in restitution the State intended to pursue. (Br. of 
Appellant, Argument B.(2)). Specifically, at the plea hearing, Gibson entered a guilty 
plea on count one and the State dismissed count two. In addition, the parties agreed to 
have the trial court determine restitution at a later date. Notably, the prosecutor did not 
provide restitution amounts as required by law. (See id.)\ see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-
38a-202. Thereafter, in connection with the restitution hearing, the prosecutor requested 
and the trial court granted restitution for $238,184.92, including amounts for the 
dismissed count two, among other things. That was improper. (Br. of Appellant, 
Argument B.(2)). The circumstances here support a latent ambiguity in the meaning of 
an essential term of the plea agreement: i.e., the amount in restitution. This Court may 
rely on principles of contract law and correct the matter by placing the parties in their 
original pre-plea positions, as set forth in State v. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, 60 P.3d 
582. That is an appropriate remedy in this case. (Br. of Appellant, Argument B.(2), C). 
In response to Gibson's arguments, the State focuses only on the first point: 
whether Gibson made a knowing and voluntary plea. (See Br. of Appellee, 8-22). 
Significantly, the State does not dispute that the plea proceedings failed to support a 
meeting of the minds. (IdL (making no reference to the plea under contract principles)). 
Likewise, it does not dispute that Bickley governs the result here. (See id. (making no 
reference to Bickley)). Since the State has not addressed that argument in its brief, it may 
not dispute the matter in subsequent proceedings on appeal. See Foothill Park, LC v. 
Judstonjnc, 2008 UT App 113, Tf 4 n.4, 182 P.3d 924 (stating this Court will not 
address appellee's argument raised for the first time at oral argument); Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9), (b) (2008) (requiring the appellee to follow briefing standards). In addition, 
since the State has not disputed Gibson's second argument, this Court may resolve the 
matter "cby placing [the parties] in their original positions'" and vacating the plea 
agreement. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, Iff 16-17 (citation omitted). 
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ARGUMENT 
THE LAW REQUIRES MAJOR TERMS OF A PLEA AGREEMENT TO 
BE EXPLICIT AND UNAMBIGUOUS. THE STATE DOES NOT DISPUTE 
THAT THE AGREEMENT HERE WAS CONFUSING AND IT FAILED 
TO SUPPORT A MEETING OF THE MINDS. THUS, THE TRIAL 
COURT SHOULD HAVE RETURNED THE PARTIES TO THEIR PRE-
PLEA POSITIONS. 
A. THE STATE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT IN ORDER FOR A PLEA TO BE 
KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY, IT MUST BE SUFFICIENT TO ALERT THE 
DEFENDANT TO "ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION" AND 
INTELLIGENT CHOICES. 
The State does not dispute that a trial court must ensure compliance with 
constitutional and state law requirements "when a guilty plea is entered." State v. 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987); (see also Br. of Appellee, 8-22; Br. of 
Appellant, Argument A.(l)). Likewise, the trial court must ensure that the defendant has 
a full understanding of what the plea involves '"and of its consequence.'" Gibbons, 740 
P.2d at 1312 (citation omitted); (Br. of Appellee, 10 (stating a plea is knowing and 
voluntary if it '"represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative 
courses of action open to the defendant'" (citation omitted))). 
In its brief, the State points out that some courts have ruled that restitution is not a 
"consequence of pleading guilty." (Br. of Appellee, 14-16 (citing cases)). Indeed, courts 
in other jurisdictions have relied on state law to rule that restitution does not qualify as 
criminal punishment, and therefore is not a consequence of the guilty plea. See, e.g., 
State v. Groppi, 840 A.2d 42, 45 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004) (relying on Connecticut law and 
ruling that restitution is not a direct consequence of the plea and the trial court is not 
required to ensure that defendant has a full understanding of it); Cruz v. State, 742 So.2d 
3 
489, 490 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (relying on Florida law to rule that restitution is a 
civil consequence and does not have to be considered with a guilty plea); see also Alford 
v. State, 651 So.2d 1109, 1113 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (relying on Alabama law and 
stating defendant was not entitled to be infontned of restitution amounts at the time of the 
plea). The decisions from those jurisdictions are not relevant here. 
Under Utah law, restitution qualifies as both a rehabilitative measure and criminal 
punishment. See State v. Miller, 2007 UT App 332, \ 19, 170 P.3d 1141 (recognizing 
that restitution serves many purposes including deterrence); State v. Cabrera, 2007 UT 
App 194, *U\ 8-9, 163 P.3d 707 (recognizing that restitution serves as criminal punish-
ment, and therefore may not be discharged in bankruptcy). In addition, Utah law 
specifies that a prosecutor "shall provide" actual or estimated amounts in restitution at the 
time of the plea disposition. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-202(l)(b); see also i(L_ at § 77-
38a-102(10) (2003) (defining plea disposition); Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 
556, 559 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (stating use of the word "shall" in a statute is presumed to 
be mandatory) (citations omitted). The State does not dispute those provisions. (See Br. 
of Appellee, 8-22); see also Salt Lake Child and Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. 
Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1021 (Utah 1995) (stating it is not an appellate court's 
"prerogative to rewrite [a statutory provision] or to question the wisdom, social 
desirability, or public policy underlying it"). 
In that regard, Utah law supports that restitution is a direct consequence of 
pleading guilty to an offense. (See, e.g., Br. of Appellant, 16-21, 27-28); see also State v. 
King, 759 P.2d 1312, 1314 (Ariz. 1988) (recognizing that a "defendant cannot voluntarily 
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and intelligently enter a plea agreement where he does not know the amount of 
restitution"); State v. Tracy* 869 P.2d 425 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that restitution 
is a direct consequence of a plea); Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312 (recognizing that the trial 
court must ensure that the defendant understands the consequence of the plea); (R. 23-24 
(reflecting the prosecutor's understanding that restitution is one of the "Consequences of 
Entering a Guilty Plea")).1 
While the State does not dispute that Utah law requires a prosecutor to provide 
restitution amounts at the plea hearing (see Br. of Appellee, 8-22), it complains that in 
"some cases" or "many cases" the prosecutor may not know the "exact figure" for 
restitution or may not be able to accurately assess it due to a victim's ongoing medical 
needs and expenses. (Id., 17-18). That complaint is irrelevant. Utah law allows a 
prosecutor to qualify a restitution disclosure at the plea hearing as an "estimated amount." 
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-202(l)(b) (requiring the prosecutor to provide actual or 
estimated amounts "determined at that time"). In addition, the statute requires the 
prosecutor to provide "restitution claims" relating to charges that are not prosecuted as 
part of the plea agreement. Zrf, at § 77-38a-202(3). The State does not dispute those 
provisions. (See Br. of Appellee, 8-22). 
In addition, the State does not dispute (see Br. of Appellee, 8-22) that when a trial 
court takes a plea, it must ensure that the agreement is clear to the defendant, and that 
1
 In California, the supreme court ruled that under state law, restitution is a direct 
consequence of the plea and must be disclosed at the time of the plea hearing. See_ People 
v. Walker. 819 P.2d 861, 866 (Cal. 1991) (en banc). In addition, if the trial court fails to 
disclose the maximum amount in restitution at the time of the plea, that constitutes errors. 
Id. However, under California law the error may be assessed for prejudice. IdL 
5 
significant terms and conditions are explicit and unambiguous. See United States v. 
Bums, 160 F.3d 82, 83 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating significant terms should be explicit and 
unambiguous); State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, Tf 19, 69 P.3d 838 (recognizing that 
ambiguities must be clarified) (citation omitted); (see also Br. of Appellant, 16-19). If 
the terms are ambiguous or confusing, courts look to principles of contract law. See, e.g., 
State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 386-87 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). However, the principles 
are tempered to take into account the unique circumstances of a plea agreement. See id. 
at 387. "For example, in interpreting plea agreements or determining their validity, 
courts may in certain circumstances hold the government to a higher standard than the 
defendant." Id (citations omitted); see also In re Altro, 180 F.3d 372, 375 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(recognizing that government attorneys "generally draft[] the agreement" and the 
government "enjoys significant advantages in bargaining power"; thus, courts resolve 
ambiguities against the government); (Br. of Appellant, Argument A.(3)). 
This Court relied on contract principles in Bickley. There the defendant agreed to 
pay "total victim restitution" and the parties agreed at the plea hearing to have the trial 
court decide restitution amounts at a later date. 2002 UT App 342, ^ 3. The court later 
ordered restitution that included child support payments for dates prior to those alleged in 
the Amended Information. Id. at j^ 4. Defendant appealed; he claimed "total" restitution 
should be limited to years set forth in the Amended Information, while the State argued it 
should include amounts for earlier dates. See id, at fflf 10-11. This Court declined to inter-
pret the plea, see idLat^ 12, and instead ruled that the parties lacked a "meeting of the 
minds" in the agreement with regard to restitution. IcL at <|[ 15. According to the Court, 
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[B]oth parties to the plea agreement lacked clear understanding of certain terms to 
which they allegedly agreed. If an agreement is reasonably disputed, or if there is 
some misunderstanding, it is the responsibility of the trial court to assure that the 
agreement is clear to all parties before ordering restitution beyond that alleged in 
the information. See id. Because both parties lacked a clear understanding of 
what was meant by total victim restitution, this situation "can be most easily 
corrected by placing [Defendant and the State] in their original positions." Id_ 
Id, at % 16 (citing State v. Bero, 645 P.2d 44, 47 (Utah 1982)). Bickley applies here. 
B. THE PROSECUTOR CONSIDERED RESTITUTION TO BE A "MAJOR" 
CONCERN OF THE AGREEMENT. YET HE FAILED TO PROVIDE 
RESTITUTION AMOUNTS AS REQUIRED BY LAW. THUS. GIBSON WAS 
DENIED INFORMATION THAT WOULD ALLOW HER TO MAKE A 
KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY PLEA. 
(1) In Connection with Its Claim that the Plea Was Knowing and Voluntary, the 
State Has Relied on an Irrelevant Premise. That Is, the State Believes that 
Gibson Is Seeking a Rule that Would Require the Trial Court to Resolve 
Restitution Amounts Before the Plea Hearing. That Is Incorrect. 
In this appeal, the State has addressed only the question of whether Gibson entered 
into a knowing and voluntary plea. (See Br. of Appellee, 8-22). To that end, it has 
reframed the argument in order to tear it down. According to the State, " Defendant[] 
claimfs]" that "a plea cannot be knowing unless a defendant knows, in advance [of the 
plea], what restitution will be ordered." (Br. of Appellee, 13 (emphasis added); see also 
id., 21 (stating defendant claims a plea cannot be knowing "unless the amount of 
restitution has been ascertained")). The State then rejects that "claim" by asserting that a 
defendant is not entitled to have restitution resolved before entering a plea agreement (see 
id., 13-14; see also id., 18 (claiming it makes "little sense" to have restitution 
"determined prior to entry of a plea")); and that such a process would have a chilling 
effect on plea agreements. (See, e.g., id., at 17-19). Specifically, according to the State, 
7 
prosecutors would be reluctant to offer pleas if they first had to provide "an exact figure" 
for restitution (jcL_9 17); and trial courts would be unwilling to accept pleas if they were 
not allowed to resolve final restitution in a later hearing. (A/., 17-18). 
The State's arguments are irrelevant. Gibson does not claim that restitution must 
be decided before the parties may enter into a knowing and voluntary plea. (Br. of 
Appellant, Argument). In addition, Gibson does not dispute that parties may enter into an 
agreement that allows the trial court to resolve restitution at a later hearing. (See, e.g.* 
id., 19-21). Indeed, under the law parties may enter into a knowing and voluntary plea 
agreement even if they dispute restitution amounts. (See id., Argument A.(2)). 
However, in order for the plea to be knowing and voluntary, both parties must be 
apprised of pertinent information. (See Br. of Appellant, 16-21). According to Utah law, 
the prosecutor must provide actual or estimated amounts for restitution at the time of the 
plea disposition. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-202(l). In addition, the prosecutor must 
provide "restitution claims" for charges that "are not to be prosecuted as part of a plea 
disposition." IcL at § 77-38a-202(3). Under those provisions, the prosecutor's 
disclosures will allow the defendant to make "ca voluntary and intelligent choice among 
the alternative courses of action'" (Br. of Appellee, 10 (citation omitted)) even if the 
prosecutor qualifies the amounts as estimates. In addition, the disclosures will ensure 
that both parties have a basic understanding of the possibilities under the plea; and the 
disclosures will ensure that the defendant is aware of the criminal punishment and 
consequences of the plea. See State v. Lukens, 729 P.2d 306, 309 (Ariz. 1986) 
(recognizing defendant must be informed of amounts in restitution for a plea agreement 
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to be voluntary and intelligent); State v. Chapman, 362 N.W.2d 401, 404 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1985) (allowing withdrawal of a plea where the defendant was not apprised of substantial 
amounts in restitution); (see also supra, n. 1, herein, and accompanying text; Br. of 
Appellant, 26-33). 
Moreover, the requirements at § 77-38a-202 are consistent with other provisions. 
Specifically, the prosecutor's disclosures may clarify ambiguities in the agreement so that 
the trial court may determine "what agreement has been reached" between the parties. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(6) (2008); (see also Br. of Appellant, 17-18 (recognizing that 
under the law, the trial court must clarify ambiguities and determine what agreement has 
been reached before accepting a plea)). Likewise, once the prosecutor provides the 
amounts, the defendant may proceed with the plea agreement and request a full hearing 
on restitution for resolution at a later date. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(4) (2003). The 
prosecutor's disclosures at the plea hearing do not guarantee a favorable result or a risk-
free sentence for the defendant, as suggested by the State. (See Br. of Appellee, 13-14). 
Rather, the disclosures inform the defendant of the risks and consequences so that he may 
enter into a knowing plea. (Br. of Appellant, Argument A.(l), (2)). 
In addition, the requirements at § 77-38a-202 are consistent with statutory 
provisions governing presentence reports. (See, e.g., Br. of Appellee, 18 (referencing 
presentence reports)). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-203, the Department of 
Corrections is required to prepare a presentence report containing restitution amounts and 
recommendations. The report is based on "all available" information requested by the 
Department from "[t]he prosecutor" and the pertinent "law enforcement agency," Utah 
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Code Ann. § 77-38a-203(l)(a) (2003), and the amounts are calculated using the same 
criteria that the prosecutor must use in making his plea-disposition disclosures. Compare 
id. (requiring the Department to specify restitution as defined by "Section 77-38a-302"), 
and id. at § 77-38a-202(2)(a) (requiring the prosecutor to use criteria "set forth in Section 
77-38a-302"); see also id_ at § 77-38a-201 (2003) (requiring law enforcement to assess 
restitution). In addition, the Department may request backup materials from the victim to 
verify amounts. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-203(l)(b). 
Notwithstanding the mandatory language of § 77-38a-202, the State seems to 
suggest in this case that the prosecutor was excused from providing the restitution 
amounts at the plea hearing (see Br. of Appellee, 10), and/or that Gibson knew what she 
had misappropriated "and, therefore knew the amount of restitution that might be 
required." (Id., 19; see also id., 10, 12). The record belies both claims. 
First, based on the record of the plea, the prosecutor was not excused from 
disclosing restitution amounts. (See, e.g., R. 19-29 (reflecting plea agreement); 196:1-10 
(reflecting plea proceedings)). Indeed, at the time of the plea in 2004, the prosecutor 
possessed actual and estimated restitution amounts. According to the record, in 2003 an 
investigator for the prosecution, Charles Haussler, collected information involving 
Gibson and financial transactions for 2002 and 2003. (See, e.g., R. 195:5-17, 21). 
Haussler examined bank accounts, credit card purchases, legal documents, mortgage 
indebtedness, and finances for storage units. (See R. 195:5-17). He met with Gibson and 
she provided explanations for purchases and produced some receipts and documents. (R. 
195:18-19). Apparently, Haussler was not persuaded: after the investigation, he provided 
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"evidence" to the prosecutor to screen for criminal charges. (R. 3-5 (stating the prose-
cutor relied in part on Haussler)); State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 788 (Utah 1984) 
(stating information known to an officer working on a case is charged to the prosecutor). 
In February 2004, the prosecutor filed the Information, relying in part on 
Haussler's investigation. (See R. 3-5). Thereafter, in June 2004, the prosecutor prepared 
the plea agreement and the trial court conducted the plea hearing. (R. 19-29; 196:1-10). 
Gibson entered a guilty plea on count one and agreed to pay a substantial amount in 
restitution: $55,220. (R. 19-29). The prosecutor represented that he would dismiss count 
two, and he stated that the parties needed "a brief restitution hearing to determine how 
much credit the court" would give Gibson in the matter. (R. 196:1-2). The prosecutor 
also referenced the amount of $55,220 (R. 196:2, 6) and he made a reference to a mort-
gage on Melba Wisdom's property. (R. 196:6); see also State v. GallU 967 P.2d 930, 937 
(Utah 1998) (stating counsel's statements at the plea hearing are not sufficient to support 
that defendant has admitted responsibility for conduct for purposes of restitution); State v. 
Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1273 (Utah 1988) (stating the most effective way to demon-
strate that defendant has an understanding of the nature of the charge and the actions, 
which make him guilty, is to have him state his understanding in his own words). At the 
time of the plea, the prosecutor specifically did not indicate that he would pursue any 
amount for the mortgage on the dismissed count two, or an additional $81,305 on count 
one. (See R. 19-29; 196:1-10); but see Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-202(l), (3) (requiring 
the prosecutor to provide restitution amounts at the time of the plea disposition). 
Thereafter, in October 2004, the trial court held the restitution hearing. (R. 195). 
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The prosecutor requested $238,184.92. (R. 195:46-47,56-57). The total included the 
$55,220 that Gibson agreed to pay for count one, and $101,659.92 for the dismissed 
count two. (R. 195:12-13 (identifying that amount for the mortgage)). Also, it included 
$81,305 for cash withdrawals or checks. (R. 195:16, 46-47). Those amounts should have 
been disclosed at the plea hearing. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-202(l), (3). The 
prosecutor was required to provide the information at the time of the plea disposition on 
the second-degree-felony offense. See_ idL_ 
Second, while the State claims that Gibson "knew" what amounts would be 
involved in restitution (Br. of Appellee, 19), that claim is mistaken. The State's agent 
and the prosecutor pored over transactions and documents to calculate amounts for 
criminal charges against Gibson. (See, e.g., supra, pp. 10-11, herein). Assuming 
arguendo Gibson had the expertise and ability to engage in the same investigation, there 
is no reason to believe she would have calculated the same amounts for criminal conduct 
or would have come to the same conclusions as the prosecutor. (See R. 195:18-19, 27-29 
(reflecting that Gibson tried to explain expenditures to Haussler); 89-90; 146-47,112 
(reflecting that Gibson was not apprised of restitution amounts)). 
In short, at the time of the plea, the prosecutor was in exclusive possession of 
specific information for restitution. (See, e.g., supra, pp. 10-11, herein), [n addition, he 
was required under the law to provide that information at the plea disposition. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-38a-202(l), (3). The prosecutor failed to do so. (R. 19-29; 196:1-10). As a 
result, Gibson was not informed of a "major concern" and a consequence of the plea. 
(See R. 196:2 (reflecting the prosecutor's claim that restitution was a "major concern")); 
12 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312 (stating the trial court must ensure the defendant understands 
the consequence of the plea). The trial court failed to ensure a knowing and voluntary 
plea. (See Br. of Appellant, Argument B.(l)). On that basis, the case should be 
remanded in order that Gibson may withdraw the plea agreement. See, e.g., Chapman, 
362 N.W.2d at 404 (although the parties agreed "to leave restitution to the trial court," 
defendant should be allowed to withdraw the plea agreement where restitution may have 
included amounts for dismissed counts). 
(2) The State Does Not Dispute that Under Principles of Contract Law, the Trial 
Court Should Have Returned the Parties to Their Pre-Plea Positions. This 
Court May Apply that Remedy Here. 
In this case, the prosecutor drafted the plea agreement (R. 19-29) and represented 
to the court that restitution was a "major concern." (R. 196:2). However, the prosecutor 
did not provide the amounts in restitution that he intended to pursue. (See R. 196:1-10; 
19-29); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-202(l) (requiring a prosecutor to provide 
amounts at the plea disposition). He did not indicate that he intended to pursue an 
additional $81,305 on count one. (R. 19-29; 196:1-20). In addition, although the 
prosecutor agreed to dismiss count two (R. 24; 196:1), he did not disclose his intent with 
respect to restitution on that count. (See, e.g., Br. of Appellant, Argument B.(2); see also 
R. 196:6 (referencing the mortgage but failing to reference any restitution on the 
dismissed count)). That was improper. See_ Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-202(3). 
The State does not dispute that at the time of the plea, the parties lacked a "clear 
understanding of certain terms to which they allegedly agreed." Bickley, 2002 UT App 
342, ^[16. The plea agreement reflected a "misunderstanding," zd., that the trial court 
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failed to clarify. (See Br. of Appellant, Argument B. (2)). 
Moreover, restitution amounts relating to count two were improper under the law. 
Specifically, a court may order restitution when the defendant has been convicted of 
criminal conduct resulting in pecuniary damages, when the defendant has admitted 
responsibility for the criminal conduct even if he has not been convicted, or when the 
defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a) (2003); see also id. at § 76-3-201(l)(b) (defining "[criminal 
activities" to mean any offense for which defendant "is convicted or any other criminal 
conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or 
without an admission of committing the criminal conduct"); Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, |^ 
9; State v. Mast 2001 UT App 402,1f 18, 40 P.3d 1143 (stating the law requires "'that 
responsibility for the criminal conduct be firmly established, much like a guilty plea, 
before the court can order restitution'") (citation omitted); (Br. of Appellant, 35-39). 
However, in this case, Gibson did not plead guilty to count two, she did not agree 
to pay for a loan against Melba Wisdom's home or real property, and she did not admit 
responsibility for criminal activity constituting theft by deception and false pretenses for 
the loan against the home. (See R. 19-20; 24; 196:1-10); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405(1) 
2
 The State asserts - without argument - that boilerplate language in the agreement 
advised Gibson that she may be required to pay restitution on dismissed counts. (Br. of 
Appellee, 10). Yet the agreement stated only that defendant "may be ordered" to make 
restitution on dismissed charges. (R. 23). That language is insufficient under Utah law to 
support liability for restitution on dismissed counts. See Bickley% 2002 UT App 342, \ 9 
(recognizing a defendant may be required to pay restitution on dismissed counts if he 
agrees to pay such restitution or if he "admits responsibility" for the dismissed conduct); 
Mast, 2001 UT App 402, J^ 18 (stating the defendant's admission of responsibility must 
be firmly established, '"much like a guilty plea'") (citation omitted). 
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(2003) (defining theft by deception); (see also Br. of Appellant, 35-39). 
In fact, at the time of the plea, the prosecutor made a reference to the mortgage on 
Melba Wisdom's property, but no reference to deception or false pretenses for count two, 
theft by deception. (See R. 196:6); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405(1) (defining 
theft by deception); GallU 967 P.2d at 937 (stating counsel's statements in a plea hearing 
are not sufficient to show that defendant admitted responsibility for criminal conduct for 
purposes of restitution). Thus, "[b]ased on [a] review of the plea agreement and the 
record, we cannot say that responsibility [for the amount was] firmly established. 
'Without making inferences as the trial court did, it cannot be said that [the Defendant in 
this case] admitted responsibility for"5 restitution on the dismissed count. Bickley, 2002 
UT App 342, H 12 (internal citations omitted). Moreover, at the time of the plea, the 
prosecutor gave no indication that he would pursue the full mortgage amount. (See R. 
19-29; 196:1-10). 
In the end, since the prosecutor intended to pursue an additional $81,305 in 
restitution on count one and $101, 659.92 on the dismissed count two as part of a plea 
disposition, he was required to provide those actual or estimated amounts at the plea 
hearing. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-202(l), (3). Since he failed to so, the record supports 
that the parties lacked a "clear understanding of certain terms to which they allegedly 
agreed." See Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, ^ 16. Thus, the trial court should have returned 
the parties to their original pre-plea positions. IcL This Court may order that remedy 
here. 
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C. GIBSON'S APPEAL AT THIS JUNCTURE IS APPROPRIATE. 
Finally, the State claims - without argument - that "defendant does not appeal the 
trial court's determination that the restitution amount accurately reflected the value of the 
property misappropriated." (Br. of Appellee, 19; see also id., 12 (stating the defendant 
did not appeal restitution)). That claim is a red-herring. At the urging of the State, this 
Court ruled in Bickley that when a restitution provision in the agreement is susceptible to 
different interpretations and the defendant's understanding differs from the State's, the 
remedy is to return the parties to their pre-plea positions. See Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, 
1fl[ 15-16 (citing inter alia, 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 31 (1991) ("'Where after the 
parties have apparently agreed to the terms of a contract, circumstances disclosed a latent 
ambiguity in the meaning of an essential word by which one of the parties meant one 
thing and the other a different thing, the difference going to the essence of the supposed 
contract, the result is that there is no contract.'")). Such a remedy is available from a 
motion to withdraw the plea agreement. See, e.g.. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, fflf 1, 23 
(vacating the conviction and remanding the case as a remedy on appeal from an order on 
a motion to withdraw the plea). 
To the extent the State is claiming here that Gibson should have taken another 
course of action, its claim is inadequately briefed: it has failed to provide any citation to 
authority or reasoned analysis. (See Br. of Appellee, 12, 19); State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 
299, 305 (Utah 1998) (stating that adequate briefing requires citations to authority and 
reasoned analysis based on that authority); Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), (b) (specifying 
briefing requirements); see also Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, | 43, 104 P.3d 
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1208 (stating Utah courts will not address inadequately briefed arguments); Calhoun v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Inc. Co.. 2004 UT 56, \ 34, 96 P.3d 916 (declining to address 
inadequately briefed claim); Coleman by and through Schefski v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, ^ 
7-9, 17 P.3d 1122 (refusing to consider inadequately briefed claims, and rejecting party's 
efforts to cure defects in subsequent briefing); Hamilton v. Parkdale Care Center, Inc., 
904 P.2d 1110, 1113 €& n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (recognizing appellate courts 
"'routinely decline[] to consider arguments which are not adequately briefed'" (cite 
omitted); and rejecting plaintiffs attempts to comply with the appellate rules in a 
supplemental brief). Thus, this Court may reject the State's claim. See Carrier, 2004 UT 
9 8 4 4 3 . 
CONCLUSION 
Gibson respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling on the 
motion to withdraw the plea agreement, and remand this case for further proceedings. 
SUBMITTED this \ S day of ^\AUA^A , 2009. 
Linda M. Jones 
Bevan Corey 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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